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The case for an independent central bank is increasingly accepted.
The central banks of Chile, France, Mexico, New Zealand, and Venezu-
ela have all had their independence enhanced; the Maastricht treaty
requires national central banks participating in the European System of
Central Banks to meet a prescribed standard of independence; and a
lively discussion is under way in Britain of the desirability of making
the Bank of England, now explicitly subservient to the Treasury,
independent.1
This new orthodoxy is based on three foundations: the success of
the Bundesbank and the German economy over the past 40 years; the
theoretical academic literature on the inflationary bias of discretionary
policymaking; and the empirical academic literature on central bank
independence.2 Every orthodoxy, even an incipient one, deserves to be
questioned;3 and there is indeed reason to be careful about the lessons
*At the time this paper was presented, Debelle was a Ph.D. student in the Department
of Economics at the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, where Fischer was Professor
of Economics. Debelle joined the Research Department of the Reserve Bank of Australia in
September 1994; Fischer is on leave from MIT at the International Monetary Fund. The
authors thank Rudiger Dornbusch and Peter Klibanoff for useful suggestions. This paper
has also benefited from comments by participants at the Center for Economic Policy
Research (Stanford)-Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco conference in March 1994, and
the Macroeconomics seminars at MIT and Harvard.
~ See, for instance, Roll Committee (1993) and Vibert (1993).
2 The analytic literature starts from Kydland and Prescott (1977); most recently, see
Persson and Tabellini (1993) and Walsh (1993). The academic literature on central bank
independence is comprehensively summarized in Cukierman (1992); see also Cukierman
and others (1993).
3 Hall (1994) questions the new conventional wisdom by focusing on the Bundesbank,
arguing that its success is due more to the nature of wage bargaining in the German
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drawn from recent work. In particular, the literature does not establish
that more independence is necessarily better than less.
We examine each of the three legs of the current argument for
central bank independence. First, while the Bundesbank has achieved
an enviable record of producing price stability, it has done so in 1993-94,
as in the early 1980s, at a high price in terms of forgone output. It is not
self-evident that the Bundesbank’s trade-off between inflation and
output should be emulated in other countries. Indeed, it is puzzling that
a central bank that supposedly commands massive credibility has, since
1980, presided over two big recessions in order to maintain low
inflation.
Second, the academic literature on dynamic inconsistency does not
point directly to an independent central bank as the solution to the
inflationary bias of discretionary policy; rather, dynamic inconsistency
was advanced originally as an argument for a monetary rule rather than
discretion, and a monetary rule does not need an independent central
bank. The more relevant game-theoretic argument derives from the
work of Rogoff (1985) and suggests the appointment of conservative
central bankers as a solution to the inflationary bias problem.~ But the
Rogoff approach also implies that a central bank can be too independent
to be socially optimal,s Recently this literature has been taken in a new
direction by Walsh (1993) and Persson and Tabellini (1993) to examine
incentive contracts for central bankers; along the lines of the contract of
the Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand (Dawe 1990).
The empirical literature on central bank independence shows a
significant negative correlation between average inflation over 10-year
periods and a measure of independence (constructed from legal provi-
sions) among developed countries. However, the coefficient on this
measure is positive, although not significant, in a regression that also
includes less developed countries (Cukierman 1992, p. 420). The nega-
tive correlation among industrialized countries may reflect merely the
common influence of a national aversion to inflation that affects both
inflation and central bank independence: As shown below, countries
with less aversion to inflation will tend to have less independent central
banks.6,7 Cukierman and colleagues (1993), attempting to deal with
reverse causation, show that growth and central bank independence
4 Lohmann (1992) extends the Rogoff rule to allow the conservative central banker to
be overruled by the government, at a cost; this produces a non-linear rule in which the
central bank responds proportionately more strongly to large than to small disturbances.
5 Freedman 0993) presents an interesting perspective on the increased interest in
central bank independence, emphasizing the growing recognition of the need for a clear
mandate for the central bank, and for central bank accountability.
6 See Debelle (1994).
7 Here the independence of the central bank is measured by the weight placed on
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remain significantly positively correlated even when an instrumental
variables procedure is used.
In discussing central bank independence, it is useful to draw a
distinction between goal independence and instrument independence.8 A
central bank has goal independence when it is free to set the final goals
of monetary policy. Thus, a central bank with goal independence could,
for instance, decide that price stability was less important than output
stability and act accordingly. Goal independence is related to the Grilli,
Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) concept of political independence;
however, by political independence they mean the central bank’s ability
to pursue the goal of low inflation free of political interference.9
According to these authors, the German and Dutch central banks have
the most political independence. A bank that has instrument indepen-
dence is free to choose the means by which it seeks to achieve its goals. 10
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand, whose goals are precisely described
in a contract with the government, has no goal independence; however,
it has instrument independence since it chooses the method by which it
tries to achieve the pre-assigned goals.11 A central bank whose task was
specified as attaining a given growth rate of the money stock would
have neither goal nor instrument independence.12
In this paper we first review empirical evidence on the relationship
between central bank independence and economic performance, in that
context discussing the performance of the Bundesbank. Next a model
developed by Debelle (1994) shows how to determine the optimal
objective function for a central bank. We then discuss lessons of recent
work on optimal incentive contracts for central banks and relate them to
the distinction between goal and instrument independence for the
central bank.
We will argue that industrialized countries face a real trade-off
between the length and depth of recessions and the variability of
inflation, and that the trade-off is not best left to a central bank that is
isolated from political pressures. Rather, central banks need to be given
a clear mandate and clear incentives to perform, and they must be
accountable for their actions. Comparing the Federal Reserve and the
8 The distinction is related to that drawn by Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991)
between political and economic independence.
9 Although tlxese authors state in their text that this is their criterion, all but one of the
eight variables they include in their measure of political independence relate to freedom
from government intervention in central bank decisions.
lo The definition here differs slightly from that of Grilli and his colleagues, who define
economic independence by the extent of government access to central bank credit, by
whether the central bank sets the discount rate, and by whether it supervises banks.
11 Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991) would describe the Reserve Bank of New
Zealand as having complete political independence.
12 A little ambiguity exists here, since technical decisions still have to be made in
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Bundesbank, we will argue that while the Bundesbank has successfully
defined a clearer mandate for itself, the Fed comes closer to meeting the
accountability criterion--and that each could benefit from moving in the
direction of the other.
Empirical Evidence on
Central Bank Independence
Although both the Barro and Gordon (1983) and the Rogoff (1985)
articles are usually cited in any discussion of the case for central bank
independence, they have different implications. Barro and Gordon
argue that the inflationary bias of the discretionary equilibrium in their
model is a case for a monetary rule. In their initial non-stochastic
equilibrium, the optimal rule would fix the money stock or money
growth rate. Once uncertainty is introduced and the level of output is
affected by shocks, the case becomes one for a feedback rule, in which
monetary policy responds optimally to shocks. This would be a rule
without discretion, and an independent central bank would not be
needed, just a technical institute to implement the rule.
Rogoff’s solution to the need for flexibility in monetary policy to
respond to shocks is to install a conservative central banker with the
discretion to respond to shocks and the conservatism to keep the mean
rate of inflation low. Because the central banker is conservative, the
response to shocks is also conservative; the optimal central banker is
chosen by trading off the reduction in mean inflation secured by
conservatism against the less than optimal trade-off between inflation
and output variability produced by that same conservatism. It is not
optimal in the Rogoff model to appoint a central banker whose only
concern is low and stable inflation.
Interpreted in terms of goal and instrument independence, the
Rogoff central bank can be thought of as having no goal independence--
its goals are those of the appointed central banker--and full instrument
independence.13 It is important to note that the Rogoff model implies
that if countries have central banks with differing degrees of conserva-
tism, but are hit by similar shocks, then a trade-off should be observed
between the variability of output and that of inflation, across countries.
The Rogoff approach is the basis for the definition of central bank
independence as the relative weight on inflation in the central bank’s
loss function: The more single-mindedly the law specifies that a central
bank seek to preserve the value of the currency, the more independent
13 Alternatively, one could say that instrument independence is not explicitly dis-
cussed in the Rogoff central bank model.HOW INDEPENDENT SHOULD A CENTRAL BANK BE? 199
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a As measured according to an index developed in Grilli, Maeciandaro, and Tabellini
(1991), here labeled GMT Index.
it is taken to be. This is the definition used in constructing most indices
of central bank independence. It almost makes the basic empirical result
of the independence literature, that central bank independence and
inflation performance are negatively related (Figure 1), a tautology.14
However, it is not a tautology, since the legal provisions on which most
measures of central bank independence are based do not necessarily
translate into effective action,is "
The most striking result of the empirical work is that central bank
independence appears to have no adverse consequences. Grilli, Masci-
andaro, and Tabellini (1991) show that the improved inflation perfor-
mance associated with increased central bank independence for indus-
14 In Figure 1 the inflation rate is plotted against the GMT (Gri]li, Masciandaro, and
Tabellini) index of central bank independence. Cukierman (1992), Chapter 19, compares
the different indices.
15 As noted above, the basic result does not apply when the sample is extended to
include developing countries (Cukierman 1992).200 Guy Debelle and Stanley Fischer
Figure 2
Variance in Inflation and in Output Growth
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trialized countries does not come at a cost in terms of forgone growth.
Similarly, for a cross-section of countries including less developed
counti:ies (LDCs), Cukierman and others (1993) find that while legal
independence is negatively related to growth, the coefficient is not
significant; an alternative (inverse) measure of central bank indepen-
dence, the frequency of turnover of the central bank governor, is
negatively related to growth (and positively related to inflation). Thus,
improved inflation performance does not seem to come at a cost in terms
of lower growth.
Figure 2 shows the relationship between the variability of inflation
and the variability of GDP growth over the 1960-92 period, for the
countries for which Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini constructed
measures of central bank independence (the GMT index). The associa-
tion between these measures of variability is positive and significant,
though the statistical significance disappears if Greece is excluded from
the sample. 16
la Alesina and Summers (1993) and Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) examine the
relationship between alternative measures of central bank independence and inflation and
output growth variability. Eijffinger and Schaling find that inflation variability is signifi-
cantly negatively related only to the GMT index (in two out of three decades), and thatHOW INDEPENDENT SHOULD A CENTRAL BANK BE? 201
The standard loss function in this literature penalizes deviations of
the level of output from its target level, rather than the variability of
output growth. Using measures of output deviations from linear and
quadratic trends (of log output), we still find a positive but insignificant
correlation between output and inflation variability.
These results could reflect either reverse causation from inflation
aversion to central bank independence or, closely related, the presence
of a third factor that produces both economic stability and indepen-
dence. As noted above, Cukierman and others (1993) have investigated
the reverse causation issue econometrically. Havrilesky and Granato
(1993) include both measures of the extent of corporatism17 and the
index of central bank independence in a regression for the rate of
inflation, and they find that none of the measures of corporatism,
separately or all together, enter significantly. By contrast, Hall (1994)
argues that centralized collective bargaining at the industry level (with
IG Metall setting the pattern) is at least as much responsible for low
inflation in Germany as is the independence of the Bundesbank.
On balance, the existing evidence suggests that central bank inde-
pendence is a free lunch:is It brings lower inflation and lower inflation
variability, at no cost in terms of lower output growth or greater output
variability. We will investigate the relationship between legal indepen-
dence and inflation in more detail below.
Nonetheless, an important anomaly remains. Recall the implication
of the Rogoff model that a negative relationship would be expected
between the variability of output and of inflation if countries were being
hit by the same shocks, and if the central banks were efficient but
differed in their relative tastes for inflation and output variability. At
least three factors could account for the positive relationship that in fact
obtains (Figure 2). If the variance of shocks differs systematically by
country, then we would expect to find a positive relationship, with
countries that are hit by bigger shocks~9 having greater variability of both
inflation and GDP growth. Or, if some central banks are more efficient
than others, they would do better at stabilizing on both dimensions. Or,
if more independent central banks are also more credible on inflation,
output growth variability is not significantly related to any of the measures of indepen-
dence. Alesina and Summers find that inflation and inflation variability are negatively
related to central bank independence, but that growth and the variability of growth are
unaffected by it.
17 They include three measures of the power of organized labor, two measures of the
leftward leaning of the government, and two measures of the size of the public sector.
18 This phrase was first used in the present context by Grilli, Masciandaro, and
Tabellini (1991). See also Eijffinger and Schaling (1993) and Debelle (1994).
19 These shocks could be self-inflicted: for instance, greater variability of government
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they may obtain a "credibility bonus" that makes the economy respond
more rapidly to monetary policy changes.2°
We are inclined to believe that the positive relationship between
output and inflation variability shown in Figure 2 reflects both differ-
ences in the magnitude of shocks affecting different economies and
differences in the efficiency with which policymakers respond to those
shocks.21 Countries with independent central banks are likely to be
countries with more disciplined governments and thus are likely to
suffer smaller self-inflicted shocks. Their central banks are likely to have
better research staffs and abler and more experienced decision-makers.
We suspect that the credibility bonus explanation would receive general
support, but we are more skeptical and will return to the issue below.
The evidence reviewed here leaves little doubt that, on average,
economic performance is better in countries with more independent
central banks. But we will advance the view that, for the most sophis-
ticated central banks, a trade-off remains between price level and output
stability, and that a central bank can be too independent. We pursue the
argument in a comparison of the Bundesbank and the Fed.
The Bundesbank and the Fed
Every central bank confronted with an inflationary shock has to
decide how rapidly to try to reduce inflation; the more drastic the
attempted correction, the larger will be the decline in output. To
illustrate, by 1991 the Bundesbank knew that it faced rising inflation. It
could at that point have tightened money and raised short-term interest
rates to, say, 15 percent. Such a decision would have prevented some of
the subsequent inflation, at a cost in terms of forgone output. Instead, it
chose to fight the inflation more gradually. In the fall of 1993, it faced
another decision, of whether to cut interest rates more rapidly, tending
to increase output but at the cost of a slower decline in the inflation rate.
It chose not to cut interest rates rapidly, thereby slowing the recovery
from the recession.22
To return to the credibility bonus: It is widely agreed that the
Bundesbank commands great credibility, as a result of both its indepen-
20 Kenneth Rogoff has pointed out that the relationship would also be positive if
countries differ only in the wedge between the natural rate of unemployment and the
socially optimal rate.
21 Taylor (1982) argues that the trade-off between output and inflation variability can
differ across countries due to "taste" or structural differences, but that a trade-off does
exist.
22 We take it for granted here that a short-run trade-off exists between output and
inflation, and that every central bank believes that too.HOW INDEPENDENT SHOULD A CENTRAL BANK BE? 203
Table 1
Estimates of the Sacrifice Ratio
Output Initial Change in
Loss of Rate of Inflation Rate
Disinflation Length GDP Inflation (Percentage Sacrifice
Country Period (Quarters) (%) (%) Points) Ratio
United States 8 6.29 5.67 2.14 2,94
United States 11 9.56 9.70 4.00 2,39
United States 15 16.20 12.10 8.83 1,83








Germany 1965:1V-1967:111 7 6.22 3.67 2.43
Germany 1973:1-1977:111 18 11.20 6.92 4.23
Germany 1981:1-1986:111 26 21.20 5.86 5,95
Germany 1992:11- 3.96
Source: Output losses and periods of disinflation are taken from Ball (1993) with
corrections from .a later version of that paper, and the authors’ calculations.
the inclusion of
dence and its consistent anti-inflationary behavior. This credibility
should have enabled it to deal with inflationary shocks at less output
cost than less credible central banks, such as the Federal Reserve.
Nonetheless, since 1980 it has had to produce two major recessions to
keep inflation low. From 1980 to 1983, the German economy was in
recession as the Bundesbank fought the consequences of the second oil
shock. From 1992 to the present, mid 1994, the German economy has
been in recession as it fights the consequences of unification.
In Table 1 we present estimates of the output costs (as a percentage
of GDP) of recessions in Germany and the United States since the first
oil shock in 1973. Surprisingly, the output cost of German recessions is
higher than that of U.S. recessions. Indeed, the sacrifice ratio in
Germany is generally larger than that for the United States for all recent
recessions.
In Figure 3 we plot output losses in recessions since 1962 against the
GMT Index measure of central bank independence.2~ The overall rela-
tionship is positive; it is also statistically significant. This implies that the
output loss suffered during recessions has on average been larger, the
greater the independence of the central bank.
Using an expectational Phillips curve
yt = - + et (1)
23 This relationship was discovered independently by Adam Posen (1993). The output
loss measures are taken from Ball (1993) with the inclusion of corrections from a later
version of that paper.204 Guy DebeIle and Stanley Fischer
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a As measured according to an index developed in Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini
(1991), here labeled GMT Index,
where y* is the full employment level of output, ~r is the inflation rate,
~t is the expected inflation rate, and 8t is a supply shock, the cumulative
output loss during any disinflation is
T
L = % [#(m- +
to
(2)
where to is the starting point and T is the end of the disinflation. The
more credible the central bank, the larger is/3, for reasons demonstrated
in Lucas (1973). Thus, comparing output losses in two countries, one
factor, /3, would tend to make the loss larger in the country with the
more credible central bank: The Phillips curve in that country would be
flatter. If the sum of unanticipated disinflation and the supply shocks
were the same in the two countries, then the output loss would be
higher in the country with the more credible central bank.
However, there is no reason whatsoever to expect the amount of
unanticipated disinflation to be the same: When the more credible
central bank announces that it will reduce inflation, the expectedHOW INDEPENDENT SHOULD A CENTRAL BANK BE? 205
inflation rate should fall, and output should not. Thus, it is a puzzle for
those who believe that the Bundesbank should have a credibility bonus
that Germany has had to go through recessions at least as severe as
those in the United States in order to secure reasonable price stability,
particularly given Hall’s (1994) argument that the pattern of wage
bargaining in Germany is more conducive to low inflation.
Indeed, this evidence gives the clear impression that the Bundes-
bank’s credibility is far greater in the asset markets--at least judging
from the newspapers24---than in the labor markets. At present we have
no satisfactory explanation for this difference, but as the positive slope
in Figure 3 shows, the phenomenon extends beyond the United States-
Germany comparison: Countries with greater central bank indepen-
dence tend to have greater output losses during recessions. This
suggests that no credibility bonus exists in the labor markets for more
independent central banks: They have to prove their toughness repeat-
edly, by being tough.
Ball, Mankiw, and Romer (1988) show that the Phillips curve is
steeper at higher rates of inflation; thus, the higher output cost in
Germany (say) may be caused by the fact that it started disinflating from
a lower initial level of inflation. However, controlling for initial inflation,
the positive relationship seen in Figure 2 still remains. An alternative
explanation for the relationship in Figure 2 is that different labor market
features may affect the slope of the Phillips curve and hence the amount
of unemployment and output loss necessary to achieve a given disin-
flation. Accordingly, we have run regressions that include a number of
variables to capture labor market institutions, including the degree of
wage flexibility, the degree of labor market unity, and the replacement
ratio.25 Only the replacement ratio entered significantly, but central
bank independence remained significant in all cases.
In Table 2 we present the mean inflation rates and growth rates, as
well as the variability of inflation and growth26 for the United States and
Germany for the period 1960 to 1992. Inflation in Germany was lower
than that in the United States over the period, and growth rates were the
same. The United States has more stable output and less stable inflation.
No doubt the United States could have had more stable inflation, if its
central bank had been more devoted to fighting inflation. Should it have
had such a central bank? While the empirical results on central bank
independence appear to say yes, since greater independence comes
with lower inflation and no evident costs, the comparison with German
24 That is to say, it is generally believed by asset market participants that the
Bundesbank is a tough inflation fighter.
2s The labor market variables are from Havrilesky and Granato (1993) and from
Layard, Nickell, and Jackman (1991).
26 Similar results hold for the variability of output around linear or quadratic trends~206 Guy Debelle and Stanley Fischer
Table 2
inflation and Growth Rates and Variability
Quarterly data,
Estimated over 1960
to 1992/3 United States
Average inflation 1.19
Variance inflation .69
Average real growth .73
Variance real growth ,88
















performance suggests that a trade-off exists and that we should inves-
tigate further the question of how independent (in the sense of anti-
inflationary) the central bank should be.
How Inflation-Averse Should the
Central Bank Be?
In this section we present a model, from Debelle (1994),27 in which
to consider the optimal degree of inflation aversion of the central bank.
The model includes a central bank that sets the inflation rate and a fiscal
authority that sets (distortionary) taxes and government spending and
receives seigniorage from the central bank. Output is produced by labor,
whose nominal wage is predetermined; firms maximize after-tax profits
and can hire the amount of labor they demand at the predetermined
nominal wage.28




~7 The model draws on Alesina and Tabellini (1987).
28 The single-period version of the model is presented here; the model is extended in
Debelle (1994) to two periods, which allows the government to issue debt.
29 In Debelle (1994) the social loss function also includes government spending, as in
the fiscal loss function below (equation 5). No significant results appear to depend on the
inclusion of g, which is omitted here for easier computation.HOW INDEPENDENT SHOULD A CENTRAL BANK BE? 207
This loss function may be interpreted as reflecting the preferences
of the society or those of the government. It differs from the loss
function of the fiscal authority (equation (5) below), which includes also
the level of government spending.
The social planner desires to have inflation as close to zero as
possible and to minimize the deviation of output (x) from its target level
x*. We set the inflation target at zero, recognizing that measurement
error and perhaps downward nominal price rigidities imply a slightly
higher rate, say around 2 percent.30 The target x* is the one that would
be chosen if non-distortionary taxes were available; s~ and sx are weights
on the inflation and output objectives.
The monetary authority is also assumed to be concerned only about
the levels of inflation and output:
(4)
The parameter/~ denotes the relative weight the central bank places
on output relative to inflation. It is generally interpreted as the inverse
of the extent of central bank independence, and will be used in that
sense unless otherwise noted. However, measures of central bank
independence in the empirical literature incorporate financial linkages
between the central bank and the government, as well as/~, and the
framework of this paper will allow us to distinguish these concepts. The
(standard) loss function (4) is consistent with most central bank charters,
although these generally also include responsibilities for the financial
system.
The fiscal authority’s loss function
1 = + ~x(xt - x*)2 + - (5)
includes government spending as well as inflation and output. We
assume that 3x/8~ > /~, that is, that the fiscal authority puts relatively
more weight on output relative to inflation than does the central bank.
Distortionary taxes are levied on production and are the only tax
available to the government, An increase in taxation reduces output
(which in equilibrium is always below its target level). Output is pro-
duced by labor, L, and is subject to a white noise productivity shock, at.
Xt = L~’ ea’/2. (6)
30 Very little in this paper depends on the optimal inflation rate, though of course the
evaluation of central bank independence, which assumes lower inflation is better, does.208 Guy Debelle and Stanley Fischer
Workers set the nominal wage, w (in logs), to achieve a target real
wage w*,31 so that
w=w*+pe. (7)
The representative firm’s profit function is given by:
PL~’ e~t/2(1 - "r) - wL. (8)
Solving for the firm’s labor demand, and assuming it can hire the
labor it demands at the given nominal wage, gives (the log of) output
supply:32
~/t
xt = o~(~rt - ~r~ - ~’t - w* + log~) + 2(1~/---’~--7- (9)
where o~ = 3//(1 - ~/) and, for simplicity, we set 3~ = 0.5.33
The government budget constraint is given by34
g = ¯ + ~r (10)
where g and ~" are expressed as a ratio to output. Although seigniorage
is a non-linear function of inflation, it has been linearized here for
simplicity; obviously, we assume that the economy is on the correct side
of the Laffer curve.
Nash Equilibrium
The monetary authority chooses ~rt and the government ~’t, taking
expectations and each other’s actions as given, after the workers have
chosen the wage. Expectations are formed rationally. The reaction
functions of the two authorities are as follows:
Monetary:
¯ r -     (~re + ~- + C - g* - a),
1+/~ (11)
31 The target wage w* may be explained by efficiency wage theories or an insider/
outsider model. See the discussion in Alesina and Tabellini (1987), footnote 5, p. 621.
32 Note that although the disturbance has been introduced in the supply function (6),
it could as well have been incorporated directly as a demand shock in equation (9).
33 Note from equation (10) that the problem of time inconsistency of optimal policy
would disappear if the government had access to non-distortionary taxes, in this model as
in Fischer (1980).
~ As in Alesina and Tabellini (1987)_, the following assumptions are made. Money
demand is given by M~ = P~ + ~ where X is independent of ~-. Thus ~r~ = mt - m~_1. The
government financing constraint is Gt = ~’tP.~Xt .4- M~ - Mr_1 which when divided by
nominal income gives gt = "r + (M~ - M~_I)/M~X/X~ and hence approximates to equation (10).HOW INDEPENDENT SHOULD A CENTRAL BANK BE? 209
Fiscal:





gt = g* - C + at, (15)
~x + ~g + p,3~ ~x + 3g + 2[a,3g
[a,3g + 3x         p,3g + 3x
C +             at.       (16)
The key result is that, in contrast to the existing literature, inflation
and output depend not only on the central bank’s weight on output, but
also on the fiscal authority’s weights. They also depend on the param-
eters x*, g*, and w*, which reflect the institutional and political structure
of the economy.
The average level of inflation:
(17)
depends positively on the central bank’s weight on output,/z. This is the
standard time inconsistency problem: The more weight the central bank
places on output, the greater the incentive to create surprise inflation.
Since this is perceived by the workers, in equilibrium, higher inflation
occurs but no gain in output. When the central bank’s weight on output
is zero (/~ = 0), then equilibrium inflation is zero.
Inflation depends positively on the spending target g*, as an
increase in the spending target requires more seigniorage financing.
Inflation also depends positively on output and wages, as a higher
output (employment) target or a higher real wage target increases the
monetary authority’s desire to inflate. Inflation depends negatively on210 Guy Debelle and Stanley Fischer
Table 3
Effects of Parameter Changes on the Economy
1"/~ t3x 1’3a tx*
Inflation 1’ ~, 1’ 1’ 1’
Output deviation ix - x*I ,I, ,J, 1’ I" 1’
Govt, spending deviation Ig - g*l ,[, 1" ~, 1’ 1’
/~: monetary weight on output
8x: fiscal weight on output
3a: fiscal weight on government spending
x*: output target
g*: government spending target
the ratio of the fiscal authority’s weights (SxlSg). An increased weight on
the government spending target means that taxes are increased, thus
reducing output and increasing the incentive of the monetary authority
to inflate. An increased weight on output means that the fiscal authority
reduces taxes to increase output, thus moving output Closer to its target
and reducing the incentive to inflate.
The average levels of output and government spending fall short of
their respective targets, reflecting the trade-off the fiscal authority faces
between spending and output. The difference between realized and
targeted output is decreasing in/~, and decreasing in 3x/3g. An increase
in /~ means that the central bank places more weight on the output
objective, thus inflating the economy more and decreasing the level of
distortionary taxes, while the opposite applies to the government
spending gap. Table 3 summarizes these influences of the parameters on
the economy.
The variance of inflation:
3x/3g + 1 + 2t~    a
depends positively on/~, and negatively on 3x/3~.
The variance of output:
(18)
~rx = (~xl~g) + 1 + 2t~ (19)
depends negatively on ~ and
The increase in the variance of output when central bank indepen-
dence is increased reflects the trade-off between flexibility and commit-
ment highlighted by Rogoff (1985) and Lohmann (1992) and discussed at
the beginning of this paper. When central bank independence isHOW INDEPENDENT SHOULD A CENTRAL BANK BE? 211
increased to reduce the time consistency problem, the willingness to
respond to shocks is decreased.
Inflation and taxation may be positively or negatively correlated.
They respond in opposite directions to the productivity shock, but in the
same direction to changes in the parameters (g*, w*). Optimal tax theory
implies that inflation should be positively correlated with the level of
other distortionary taxes, as each tax should be set such that the
marginal distortion is the same. However, that assumes that the taxes
are set by one authority. Here, the inflation tax is set by the monetary
authority, which has different objectives from the fiscal authority. It
prefers less seigniorage, whereas the fiscal authority always wants a
higher level of seigniorage for a given level of government spending.
Empirical examination shows no definitive relationship between infla-
tion and taxation.35
The general presumption in the literature is that the decline in
inflation as a result of increasing central bank independence must
always decrease the value of the loss function (except in terms of the loss
of flexibility discussed above). However, this relies on the specification
of the loss function solely in terms of the central bank’s objectives. Here,
although the inflation rate is clearly zero when the central bank is fully
independent, society is not necessarily better off in this case. The
expected loss in each period is:
E[Vs] = E ~2 S,n. (20)
= [Var(~r) + (E[~r])2 s~ +    . (21)
The first term is increasing in ~; however, the second term is
decreasing in/~, because while more central bank independence reduces
the level and variance of inflation, it also decreases output.36
35 See Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini (1991), who found no systematic relationship
across countries between the changes in the tax rate (expressed as the ratio of tax revenue
to GDP) and changes in seigniorage (defined as the change in the money base relative to
GDP).
36 This conclusion may be overstated if further negative effects of inflation exist that
are not captured in this simple model. For instance, inflation may have a negative effect on
productivity (Selody 1990; Fischer 1993).212 Guy Debelle and Stanley Fischer
Optimal Aversion to Inflation by the Central Bank
Rogoff (1985) solved for the optimal degree of inflation aversion of
the conservative central banker. His results were extended by Lohmann
(1992), who shows that social welfare can be increased, at a cost, if the
government retains the ability to override the conservative central banker.
In equilibrium, the government does not overrule the central bank, but
the threat of overruling ensures that the central bank follows a non-
linear rule in which it responds more vigorously to large shocks than it
otherwise would.
Implicitly, the social loss function in these articles is assumed to be
that of the (original) central banker; it fails to be optimized only because
of dynamic inconsistency. In our calculation of the optimal /~, we
minimize (21) with respect to /~, thereby minimizing the social loss
function (3).
While we do not obtain an explicit solution for/~ (although it can be
determined easily numerically), we can demonstrate the intuitive results
that the optimal degree of central bank independence
® increases with society’s aversion to inflation, and
® decreases with society’s weight on output.
Thus, not surprisingly, the extent of central bank independence
(defined as the central bank’s aversion to inflation) may be determined
by the country’s underlying aversion to inflation. It remains true that
for a given degree of inflation aversion, a country that institutes an
independent central bank with optimally chosen /~will do better
than one that simply endows the central bank with society’s social
welfare function. In this sense, the proposition that central bank
independence enhances economic performance remains valid despite
the endogeneity of central bank independence.
Stackelberg Equilibria
Although central bank independence is usually identified with/~ in
theoretical applications, empirical measures of it are closer to a more
conventional sense of independence. By including provisions such as
the term of central bank board members, and who chooses the gover-
nor, they come closer to measuring the central bank’s ability to make
decisions that are independent of those of the government.
The analytic model developed above does allow for independent
decision-making by the central bank. It is conventional to examine the
properties of only the Nash equilibrium, in which each actor takes the
actions of the other as given. An alternative sense of the independence
of the central bank relates to its need to accommodate the actions of the
fiscal authority. To the extent that the central bank can fix its actions
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be said to be more independent. We examine the effects of indepen-
dence in this sense by considering alternative Stackelberg equilibria.
Assume first that the fiscal authority moves first. The fiscal author-
ity can be thought of as having the superior commitment technology in
this case.27 This yields the following inflation rate:
3X/~(1 + 2/~)
at. (22)
3~1~2 + 3x + 3X(1 + /z)(1 + 2/z) + 3~(1 + 2/.~)/~
The Stackelberg equilibrium in which the fiscal authority leads has
to be interpreted with care. In the equilibrium that underlies equation
(22), the fiscal authority sets the level of government spending, but the
monetary authority still gets to determine the inflation rate before the
level of taxes is set. However, in choosing g, the fiscal authority takes
into account the reaction of the monetary authority to the fiscal author-
ity’s choice of g. This equilibrium may be a more appropriate description
of fiscal-monetary interactions in practice than the Nash equilibrium.
The fiscal authority may be the leader in another, more direct sense:
It can set both ~" and g and force the monetary authority to print
whatever amount of money is needed to finance the deficit. This "fiscal
domination" equilibrium, an equilibrium not unknown in the real
world, is examined at the end of this section.
Alternatively, if the monetary authority is the leader, choosing ~r
first and leaving the fiscal authority to specify g or ~, the inflation rate is:
2b~3~ 2/*~ ¢rM = (~x + 3g)2 + 2tz3~ C - (~x + 3g)2 + 41~ at. (23)
A solution like (23) is more likely to obtain if the central bank has set a
money or inflation target path, from which it will deviate only under
well-defined conditions.
First we examine the inflation rates under these assumptions. We
would expect the inflation rate to be higher when the fiscal authority
leads than in the Nash equilibrium, and to be lower than in the Nash
equilibrium when the monetary authority leads. We can show
(24)
This interpretation was suggested by David Laibson.214 Guy Debelle and Stanley Fischer
Since the fiscal authority is likely to place more weight on output relative
to inflation (3x/3~) than the monetary authority (/z), we expect ~rF > ~rN.
Comparing the inflation rate when the monetary authority is the
leader with the Nash inflation rate:
(25)
Inflation is lower when the central bank leads if 3x > 3g, a condition that
is likely to obtain.
Society’s loss functions under the two different scenarios are given
by:
Monetary:
E[Vs] = [Var(~r~) + (E[vr~])2] s~ + ~-~          , (26)
Fiscal:
E[Vs] = [Vat(Try) + (E[~r~])2] s~ +    . (27)
Next, we could ask whether it is better, from the viewpoint of society,
for the central bank to be a Stackelberg leader. Comparing the expected
value of the social loss function when the central bank is a Stackelberg
leader with its value at the Nash equilibrium, the loss function is smaller
(that is, society is better off) when the central bank leads if condition (25)
above holds and if 3g < 1 and 3g + 3x < 2.28 Thus, provided the fiscal
authority weights output losses at the margin more heavily than
increases in government spending and does not place a very high
weight on output and government spending, it is better from a social
viewpoint for the central bank to lead.
We can interpret this result as stating that it is better for the central
bank to precommit to an inflation path than to move simultaneously
with the fiscal authority, provided that the fiscal authority will not
impose excessively distortionary taxes in order to finance desired
government spending. This is not a ringing endorsement for monetary
precommitment: Monetary precommitment can be expensive if the fiscal
authority is not responsible.
28 This is a sufficient condition for society to be better off when the central bank is a
Stackelberg leader. Note that the normalization in the loss functions is that the weight on
inflation in the central bank’s loss function is one. Further, it is assumed through the
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Society is always better off in the Nash equilibrium than if the fiscal
authority leads, provided condition (24) holds, that is, provided the
central bank is more inflation-averse than the fiscal authority.39 Thus,
independence of the central bank, in the sense that it is not required to
finance a predetermined deficit, is desirable in this model.40
If the central bank is exceptionally weak, the fiscal authority may be
able to force it to finance a pre-specified deficit. In this fiscal domination
equilibrium, the fiscal authority in effect sets g, ~, and ~r, and the central
bank is a cipher. If this happens, it appears likely that the inflation rate
is higher than in the Nash equilibrium, and social welfare is lower.41
This means that the Stackelberg equilibrium, in which the monetary
authority leads, is preferable to fiscal domination--another argument
for central bank independence, appropriately defined.
Summary of Findings
In the models in this section, as in Rogoff (1985), conservative
central bankers underreact to output shocks. In addition, we have
shown that:
The optimal degree of conservatism of the central bank depends
on the society’s aversion to inflation and output fluctuations;
Society will be better off if the central bank precommits to an
inflation rate, provided the fiscal authority is reasonably well
behaved;
If the central bank is more inflation-averse than the fiscal author-
ity, society will be worse off if the fiscal authority is able to
determine the size of the deficit that must be financed by the
central bank.
Optimal Incentive Contracts
Nothing in the above analysis points to the desirability of a central
bank having unlimited independence. As in Rogoff’s (1985) model, it is
not optimal for the central bank to be monomaniacal about inflation; it
should also react to output fluctuations.
But it is possible to do better than the "optimal" central bank of the
preceding section. First, as previously noted, Lohmann (1992) shows in
the context of the Rogoff model how a non-linear reaction function,
3~ This is a sufficient condition.
4o Debt financing is not possible in this single-period version of the model. Debelle
(1994) examines the effects of debt financing in a two-period set-up.
41 That is, this result holds for all but unusual parameter values.216 Guy Debelle and Stanley Fischer
enforced by the threat of government overruling of the central bank, can
improve economic performance.
More radically, Walsh (1993) and Persson and Tabellini (1993) have
shown that a contract between the government and the central banker,
in which the central banker’s remuneration is tied linearly to the
negative of the inflation rate, can attain the first best equilibrium. They
model the relationship between the central bank and the government in
a principal-agent framework.
The conservative central banker reduces the inflationary bias of
monetary policy that results from dynamic inconsistency, but at the cost
of responding too conservatively to output disturbances. As Walsh
shows, in the standard central bank loss function, the inflationary bias
is the same in each state of nature. Accordingly, appointing a central
banker who has the same loss function as society (equation 3), and
penalizing the central banker by an amount proportional to the inflation
rate, enables society to obtain the first best solution.42
It should be emphasized that while, in this contract solution, the
government directly rewards the central banker purely on the basis of
the behavior of the inflation rate, the central bank is also concerned
about the stability of output. Monetary policy accordingly responds
actively to output disturbances.
If the central banker is not motivated by a combination of a penalty43
and society’s loss function, then the government can attempt to moti-
vate through rewards or penalties based on the behavior of both output
and inflation.44 Once again, it is possible to attain the first best solution.
This analysis again assumes that the loss function of the central
bank is that of society. If it were not, but was still known at the time of
the contract negotiation, the transfer would include an extra term
reflecting the difference between society’s and the central bank’s loss
functions. However, if the loss function of the central bank was not
known, the central bank might have an incentive to create less than the
socially desirable rate of inflation, because its payment is linear in the
inflation rate.
The principal agent framework developed by Walsh and by Persson
and Tabellini allows one to examine the issue of accountability. The
central bank is accountable to the government (and hence the public) to
42 This result is obtained by Walsh (1993) and also by Persson and Tabellini (1993).
Walsh shows that the first best can also be obtained by penalizing the central bank by an
amount proportional to the money stock which is stochastically related to the inflation rate.
43 Of course, it is only the marginal penalty that matters; the central banker has to be
sufficiently well paid to want to take the job despite the risk of having to pay penalties.
~ To obtain the first best outcome in this case, it is necessary to condition the central
banker’s penalty on the desired level of output. Walsh suggests this is difficult and that the
first best solution may on this account be unattainable. It is not obvious why there should
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achieve its inflation target. If it does not, then it is fined (which may in
reality, take the form of dismissal). This issue is taken up in the next
section.
The Central Bank Mandate and Accountability
The theories we have examined in this paper all imply that the
central bank should have a clear mandate, whether in the form of a
utility or loss function that specifies what it is to maximize, or in the
form of a specific contract that penalizes inflation. In general, the
contract instructs the central bank to minimize the social loss function
plus the penalty for excess inflation. These theories are not equipped to
deal with a fuzzy mandate or loss function, and it is difficult from the
perspective of. such theories to see the benefits of allowing the bank
discretion as to its goals. That is, these theories all imply that central
banks should not have goal independence.
The Reserve Bank of New Zealand has a clearly stated mandate to
produce a particular path for or rate of inflation, one that is negotiated
with the government. The agreement with the government allows for
the inflation rate to be affected by supply shocks. The Federal Reserve
has a vague mandate; that is, it has considerable goal independence.
The Bundesbank is required both to maintain the value of the currency
and to support the economic program of the government, provided that
does not conflict with the goal of monetary stability. All three of these
central banks have instrument independence.
The model in which the fiscal authority is a Stackelberg leader
points to the importance of not leaving the fiscal authority with the
power to fix the amount of deficit that must be financed by the printing
of money. This type of central bank independence~freedom from
having to finance the government is likely to enhance economic
performance.
The literature discussed in the previous section highlights the
notion of accountability, emphasized by John Crow, former Governor of
the Bank of Canada, and by the Roll Committee (1993). The central bank
can be held accountable either in having to justify its behavior, or in
having to pay a penalty for bad outcomes (or be rewarded for good
outcomes). Accountability mechanisms differ. The Fed is accountable to
the Congress, and to public opinion. The Bank of England is accountable
to the Treasury. The Governor of the Reserve Bank of New Zealand is
accountable to the government for meeting his contract. The Bundes-
bank has very little accountability: It does not have to account for its
behavior to the legislature, though it could be argued that it is account-
able to public opinion.
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account for superior inflation performance, we use the Grilli, Mascian-
daro, and Tabellini (1991) data and a series developed by Cukierman,
Webb, and Neypati (1992). Recall that Grilli and his colleagues create an
index of political independence: an equally weighted sum of zero or one
dummies for different aspects of, first, the appointment procedures of
the governor and board members and, second, the extent of commit-
ment to a target of monetary stability. Their index of economic indepen-
dence includes zero or one dummies for the extent to which the central
bank is required to finance the government, its freedom to set interest
rates, and whether it supervises banks.
We have created three indexes from these measures. The first is the
presence of a statutory requirement that the central bank pursue
monetary stability among its goals; this is called INFOB]. The variable
INFOBJ is a measure, albeit an imprecise one, of the lack of goal
independence of the central bank. The second is the Grilli, Masciandaro,
and Tabellini (GMT) measure of political independence, but excluding
INFOBJ. This variable, POL7, includes the legal provisions relating to
appointments and the central bank’s relationship with the government.
The third is the GMT measure of economic independence, minus the
bank supervision criterion. This variable, EC6, consists of those mea-
sures relating to the central bank’s right not to finance the government
and its right to set the discount rate. It is a measure of instrument
independence.
Cukierman, Webb, and Neypati examined the objectives of central
banks laid out in their charters and ranked them on a scale from 0 to 1,
depending on whether price stability was mentioned and whether other
potentially conflicting objectives were included. We called this index
CUK.
We ran regressions of the inflation rate against these four variables
for 17 industrialized countries in the Grilli, Masciandaro, and Tabellini
sample. Table 4 shows that the two variables most closely tied to
inflation performance are INFOBJ and EC6. The variables grouped into
POL7, which relate to appointment procedures, are not significantly
related to inflation. However, while the (0, 1) objective variable INFOBJ
was significant, the more disaggregated variable CUK was not.
Table 4 implies that inflation performance is likely to be better if the
central bank has a mandate for monetary stability, that is, no goal
independence, and if it has instrument independence. From this per-
spective, the Fed needs a less vague mandate.
We conclude by discussing accountability and output-inflation
trade-offs. We do not, at this stage, have any quantitative measures of
the accountability of the central bank. To a very limited extent, theHOW INDEPENDENT SHOULD A CENTRAL BANK BE? 219
Table 4
Inflation and the GMT Index
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significance of INFOBJ in the equations in Table 4 provides some
support for the notion that accountability matters; the extent is limited
because inclusion of an objective in the charter does not mean the
central bank is actually held accountable for achieving that objective.
Nonetheless, we suggest that accountability must be an important
mechanism to improve central bank performance, for two reasons: First,
all institutions need to be held accountable for their actions, or their
performance suffers. Second, the cult of central bank independence, the
appointment of independent central bankers, and the emphasis on
inflation in the incentive contracts seen so far, appear to lead to an
excessive concentration on inflation prevention and insufficient ac-
knowledgment of the short-run trade-offs between inflation and output.
Without accountability to elected representatives, such as the Congress,
central, banks run a very good chance of becoming too conservative.
That is the argument for greater Bundesbank accountability.
This view runs into the obstacle that the trade-offs between inflation
and output, and between inflation and output variability, implied by
most of the models in this paper, do not show up in practice. We have
run regressions similar to those in Table 4, with the growth rate of
output and inflation and output variability as dependent variables, and
have found no evidence of a trade-off. However, both theory and the
comparison between the Bundesbank and the Fed in Table 1 suggest
that a trade-off does exist for countries with first-rate central banks. And
if the trade-off exists, then the most independent central bank is not
likely to be the socially optimal central bank.220 Guy Debelle and Stanley Fischer
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Government performance follows worldwide fads. The big fad
recently has been totally unsustainable fiscal deficits. The fad in the
1970s was inflation. For reasons that escape explanation from my
understanding of political economy, the current fad among central
banks is to keep inflation close to zero. Calvo, Kydland-Prescott, and
Barro-Gordon convinced me that the central bank will always inflate, for
the same reason that a judge will impose too lenient a sentence on a
miscreant--the crime has already been committed and the sentence
cannot deter it. I am not sure that I am satisfied with any explanation as
to why central banks have not played out their inevitable role as inflators
Under received theory.
Commitment provides a good answer to the general class of
problems of which monetary policy is one. The Sentencing Act was a
natural way to harness commitment as a way to get optimal sentences.
Judges today are denied the power to be rationally but perversely lenient.
A long-standing body of advocacy, led by Milton Friedman, would
take the same approach to monetary policy. We should tie our central
bank’s hands in just the same way we tie our judges’ hands. We could
prescribe money growth or, better, prescribe a rule for the federal funds
rate, as John Taylor advocates. Alternatively, as Kenneth Rogoff has
pointed out, we could appoint central bankers with preferences unrep-
resentative of social preferences, who weight the inflation objective
heavily. We would grant the central bankers the power to determine
monetary policy independently. The corresponding approach to sen-
tencing criminals is to appoint tough judges.
*Senior Fellow, Hoover Institution, and Professor of Economics, Stanford University.DISCUSSION 223
Walsh and Persson-Tabellini have shown that a better answer is to
appoint central bankers with preferences in line with social preferences,
but to put a penalty on inflation so as to offset the inflationary bias
inherent in making decisions on the spot. Tough central bankers are
undesirable because they do not care about recessions, just as tough
judges would not be a good idea because they might convict the innocent.
As Guy Debelle and Stanley Fischer stress in their paper, nothing in
this line of thought says anything should be vague about the goals we
assign to our central bankers. If we grant any independence, we should
be sure that we set up incentives to see that social goals are properly
served. Alternatively, we could treat our central bankers as technicians,
charged with maximizing the objective function we assign them. Theory
does not distinguish between these alternatives, so the paper does not
really deal with the theory of central bank independence.
Another aspect of independence has received quite a bit of attention
at this conference, but is not considered in Debelle and Fischer’s paper:
how the central bank executes the maximization of the designated
objective function. We could dictate operating procedures in detail,
going beyond Taylor’s prescription of the federal funds rate to saying
exactly what instruments should be devoted to pegging that rate. Or we
could grant the central bank’s technicians the right to use judgment, so
long as they achieve the right combination of unemployment and
inflation.
The contributions of the paper are in two distinct areas: First, new
empirical results comparing the actual performance of economies with
hawkish or dovish central banks. Second, the last word in modeling the
monetary policy problem.
Figure 1 in the paper is the basic empirical result. Hawkishness is
measured on the horizontal axis by the Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini
measure of central bank responsibility for the price level alone. To an
impressive extent, countries get what they ask for from their central
banks. Hawkish policies should, as a matter of theory, deliver lower
price volatility and higher output volatility--this proposition received a
lot of attention in the first and second sessions of this conference.
Debelle and Fischer do not look directly at the price volatility issue, but
by combining data from their Figures 1 and 2, we can see that the
variance of inflation is generally low for hawks and high for doves, in
line with theory. The major exception is Japan, a dove by the Grilli-
Masciandaro-Tabellini measure but with a record of low inflation vola-
tility.
The paper is schizophrenic on the relation between hawkishness
and output volatility. Again, the paper omits the figure that would show
the relation between the Grilli-Masciandaro-Tabellini index and the
variance of output. The discussion observes that there is no sign that
hawkish policies adversely affect real performance. Greece, a real dove224 Robert E. Hall
according to the index, has the worst variance of real growth. And the
real hawks--Germany, Switzerland, and the United States--have very
low growth variance. On the other hand, Figure 3 shows that hawkish
countries tend to have worse recessions, in line with standard theory.
Two hawkish countries with low output growth variance have the
largest output loss from recessions--Germany and the United States.
Oddly, the paper reaches the grand conclusion that hawkish policies
deliver price stability and no cost by way of increased output variability,
before the presentation and discussion of Figure 3. The conclusion seems
to depend critically on the measure of output volatility. I believe that the
variance of the growth of real output is not a good measure, but I
recognize that any measure is controversial that is based on deviations
from a trend, "full-employment, ....potential," or other attempt to
separate a low-frequency element.
The third section of the paper looks closely at two conspicuous
hawks, Germany and the United States. Implicit in the discussion is the
proposition that the Bundesbank is even more of a hawk than the Fed,
although the two differ by only a single point on the Grilli-Masciandaro-
Tabellini scale. The puzzle is that the German sacrifice ratio is larger
than that for the United States, even though the Bundesbank presum-
ably enjoys higher credibility. To me, this finding confirms how little we
know about the sources of monetary non-neutrality. It is true that
virually every theory of non-neutrality implies that the anti-inflation
efforts of a credible central bank should come at a lower real cost; the
finding in this paper may just show that the received theories are on the
wrong track.
The theoretical model in this paper is the ultimate development of
the Calvo, Kydland-Prescott, Barro-Gordon line of research. The mon-
etary authority is seen as the strategic opponent of the fiscal authority,
and all three possibilities of sequence of play are considered.
The Debelle-Fischer model flagrantly offends Friedman’s natural
rate law, which holds that the level of output is invariant to parameters
of the monetary policy rule. Chronic, fully anticipated inflation stimu-
lates output. The mechanism is the following: Labor supply is perfectly
elastic. The government imposes a commodity tax that shifts labor
demand adversely. Seigniorage is modeled as a non-distortionary alter-
native to the tax. Hence, a policy of higher inflation lowers the
distortionary tax and raises output. This property tilts the assessment of
policies in favor of inflationary ones.
One of the most conspicuous differences between European and
American macroeconomics is that the former is comfortable with per-
fectly elastic labor supply (real wage rigidity) whereas the latter is not.
The polar alternative---a vertical labor supply curve derived from Cobb-
Douglas preferences--would require development of a full general-DISCUSSION 225
equilibrium analysis, because policy would shift labor supply as well as
labor demand.
With respect to the order of play, the paper concludes that it would
be better if the central bank moved first. The essence of the argument is
that monetary policy in that case commits not to respond to fiscal policy.
I do not see the point of this analysis. If monetary policy can commit not
to respond to subsequent fiscal policy, it could commit not to respond to
anything, in which case the entire issue considered in this literature--
fundamentally rooted in the inability to commit--would disappear.
Only the model with simultaneous play seems interesting to me.
I strongly agree with the basic conclusion of the paper, which I
would summarize in the following way: We should not appoint central
bankers who reflect our own preferences--they will be much too
inflationary. It is better to appoint hawks, but they will deliver lower
average rates of inflation only by under-responding to recessions. It is
even better to appoint central bankers with our own preferences, but
add a specific penalty against chronic inflation.
An alternative way to get the same policy is to demote central
bankers to technicians and not worry about their preferences. We could
simply tell the central bank that they must hold the unemployment rate
at 5.5 percent plus one-sixth of the consensus forecast of the rate of
inflation over the next two years. This rather dovish policy would keep
the economy on a path of around 2 or 3 percent average inflation, but it
would call for quite aggressive countercyclical action in the face of
spending shocks. The central bank could decide independently how to
achieve the target but would never struggle with the issues considered
in this paper.
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